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Abstract
This paper offers an incomplete survey of recent results on inconsistency-
adaptive logics (disregarding results on other adaptive logics). Much at-
tention is paid to the so-called standard format, because it provides most
of the required metatheory for adaptive logics that are phrased in this
format. Combined adaptive logics are also briefly discussed. Other re-
sults briefly reported on concern (i) rethinking some philosophical the-
ories from a paraconsistent viewpoint, (ii) the characterization of some
(further) inconsistency-handling mechanisms in terms of adaptive logics,
and (iii) the problem of defining criteria for final derivability. The final
section concerns a further step towards eliminating (undesired) inconsis-
tencies from a theory.
1 Introduction
As the title suggests, this paper briefly reports on some recent results in inconsistency-
adaptive logics. Completeness was not sought. The aim is rather to report on
some technical results, and on the way in which they shape the programme from
a philosophical point of view.
Adaptive logics are meant to characterize consequence relations for which
there is no positive test (that are not even partially recursive)—see [30, 29]. All
but not only non-monotonic consequence relations lack a positive test. Adaptive
logics require dynamic proofs, viz. proofs in which formulas that are considered
as derived at some stage are considered as not derived at a later stage, and
vice versa. During the last five years, most results on adaptive logics concern
ampliative adaptive logics—logics that extend CL (Classical Logic). These will
not be reported on in the present paper. However, we shall briefly mention some
ampliative results that apply generally, including in inconsistent situations—in
principle all ampliative logics have variants that apply in inconsistent situations,
but unfortunately not all of these have been studied.
∗Research for this paper was supported by subventions from Ghent University and from
the Fund for Scientific Research – Flanders.
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For readers that are not familiar with inconsistency-adaptive logics, it may
be useful to recall their effect in intuitive terms. Consider the premise set
Γ = {p,∼p, p ∨ q,∼r, r ∨ s}. On nearly all (monotonic) paraconsistent logics,1
Disjunctive Syllogism is invalid and neither q nor s is a consequence of Γ. An
inconsistency-adaptive logic AL interprets a premise set as consistently as pos-
sible. While Γ requires p ∧ ∼p to be true, it does not require r ∧ ∼r to be
true. So, on a minimally inconsistent interpretation of Γ, r comes out false and
hence s comes out true. Put differently, s is an AL-consequence of Γ, whereas
q is not. Monotonic paraconsistent logics invalidate certain CL-rules, for ex-
ample Disjunctive Syllogism, whereas inconsistency-adaptive logics invalidate
certain applications of some CL-rules, and it depends on the premises which
applications are invalidated.
The adaptive programme is neutral with respect to the question whether
there are true inconsistencies. Dialetheists, who answer the question in the
positive, will argue that most true statements are consistent, and hence that
consistency can be presupposed unless and until proven otherwise—this is pre-
cisely what inconsistency-adaptive logics do. Graham Priest has spelled this
out in [54]. People who deny that there are true inconsistencies, for example
classical logicians and intuitionists, cannot get around the fact that inconsisten-
cies occurred in the history of the sciences—see [31, 36, 37, 41, 49, 50, 51, 59]
for some case studies—and that, in the presence of inconsistent theories, one
should reason from them in order to find consistent replacements for them. As
was argued already in [3], the first step to be taken in such circumstances is
to interpret the inconsistent theory as consistent as possible, in other words to
apply an inconsistency-adaptive logic. The two aforementioned positions do not
exhaust all possibilities. Thus our own position, which is outlined and argued
for in [9], is that there is no warrant that there is a true consistent description
of the world (in a conceptual system that humans can handle), but that there
are good reasons to adopt the methodological maxim that one should try to
eliminate inconsistencies from our knowledge—this entails that inconsistencies
are seen as a problem, although not necessarily as the most urgent one.
2 The Standard Format
The growing multiplicity of adaptive logics called for systematization. The idea
was not to restrict the variety of applications that the logics capture, but rather
to find a common formal characterization. This characterization is provided by
the so-called standard format. The basic mechanism behind all adaptive logics
is the same. So the standard format, if well designed, should do most if not all
of the work. We shall see that it does.
In many situations one needs to combine adaptive logics. In this respect, the
aim was to rely on the standard format in order to design general stratagems
for combining adaptive logics. Again, the combination stratagems, rather than
specific properties of the combined logics, should warrant that the combination
does the desired job. Combined adaptive logics are discussed in Section 3.
The standard format, first presented in [8], is both simple and perspicuous.
An adaptive logic AL is in standard format if it is characterized as a triple
1Meheus’ AN∅ from [39] is an exception, but we disregard it for the present intuitive
discussion.
2
consisting of the following elements:
(i) LLL, a lower limit logic,
(ii) Ω, a set of abnormalities that all have the same logical form,
(iii) an adaptive strategy.
The lower limit logic LLL determines the part of the adaptive logic that
is not subject to adaptation. From a proof theoretic point of view, the lower
limit logic delineates the rules of inference that hold unexceptionally. From a
semantic point of view, the adaptive models of Γ are a selection of the lower
limit models of Γ. It follows that CnLLL(Γ) ⊆ CnAL(Γ). In principle, the
lower limit logic is a monotonic and compact logic—see Section 3 on combined
adaptive logics.
Abnormalities are formulas that are presupposed to be false, unless and until
proven otherwise. Ω comprises all formulas of a certain logical form, which may
be restricted—see below.
For many inconsistency-adaptive logics, Ω is the set of formulas of the form
∃(A ∧ ∼A), in which ∃A abbreviates the existential closure of A. For other
inconsistency-adaptive logics, the set is restricted, for example, to formulas in
which A is a primitive formula—a formula that contains no logical symbols
except for identity.2 Where introduced, the restriction is justifiable or even
desirable, as we shall explain in the paragraph on flip-flop logics. Examples of
such inconsistency-adaptive logics are those that have as their lower limit logic,
for example, Schu¨tte’s Φv from [58],3 Priest’s LP from [53], or Meheus’ AN∅
from [39], and modal adaptive logics that characterize paraconsistent inference
relations under a translation—several examples follow in Section 4. Incidentally,
in all these logics, every formula ∃(A ∧ ∼A) in which A is not primitive entails
a disjunction of formulas of the form ∃(B ∧ ∼B) in which B is primitive.
If the lower limit logic is extended with the requirement that no abnormality
is logically possible, one obtains the upper limit logic ULL. Syntactically, ULL
is obtained by extending LLL with an axiom stating that members of Ω entail
triviality. The lower limit logic of inconsistency-adaptive logics is a paraconsis-
tent logic, and the axiom schema (A ∧∼A) ⊃ B is the most popular candidate
for obtaining the upper limit logic. Even if Ω is characterized by a restricted
logical form, there is no need to impose a restriction on the axiom schema if,
for any C of the unrestricted form, there is a ∆ ⊆ Ω for which C `LLL
∨
(∆).
There also is no need to restate the axiom schema as ∃(A∧∼A) ⊃ B, provided
quantification behaves normally. Semantically, the upper limit logic is charac-
terized by the lower limit models that verify no abnormality. ULL requires
premise sets to be normal, and ‘explodes’ abnormal premise sets (assigns the
trivial consequence set to them).
If, as is the case for many inconsistency-adaptive logics, the lower limit
logic is a paraconsistent logic that contains full positive CL as well as excluded
middle, for example expressed as (∼A ⊃ A) ⊃ A,4 and the set of abnormalities
2Similar restrictions are imposed on many ampliative adaptive logics. See, for example,
[19] and [18].
3The Ghent name for the predicative extension of this logic is CLuNs—see [17]. Schu¨tte,
who was not a paraconsistent logician, introduced Φv for a special purpose. Many paracon-
sistent logicians rediscovered this logic or its predicative extension.
4The weakest such logic is CLuN, CL allowing for gluts with respect to negation, which
consists exactly of full positive CL together with (∼A ⊃ A) ⊃ A—see [35] for a proof of the
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comprises the formulas of the form ∃(A ∧∼A), possibly restricted as described
before, then the upper limit logic is CL.5
If the premise set does not require any abnormality to obtain, the adaptive
logic will deliver the same consequences as the upper limit logic. If the premise
set requires some abnormalities to obtain, the adaptive logic will still deliver
more consequences than the lower limit logic, viz. all upper limit consequences
that are not ‘blocked’ by those abnormalities. In sum, the adaptive logic inter-
prets the set of premises ‘as normally as possible’; it takes abnormalities to be
false ‘in as far as’ the premises permit.
The lower limit logic and the upper limit logic do not determine the set
of abnormalities Ω. A few paragraphs ago, we considered the case where Ω
contains all formulas of the form ∃(A ∧ ∼A) in which A is a primitive formula.
If the restriction is removed, the upper limit logic is still CL, but the adaptive
logic is different—see the paragraph on flip-flop logics.
An adaptive strategy is required because many premise sets LLL-entail a dis-
junction of abnormalities (members of Ω) without entailing any of its disjuncts.
Disjunctions of abnormalities will be called Dab-formulas. In the sequel, any
expression of the form Dab(∆) will refer to the (classical) disjunction of the
members of a finite ∆ ⊆ Ω. Dab-formulas that are derivable by the lower limit
logic from the premise set Γ will be called Dab-consequences of Γ. If Dab(∆)
is a Dab-consequence of Γ, then so is Dab(∆ ∪ Θ) for any finite Θ ⊂ Ω. For
this reason, it is important to concentrate on the minimal Dab-consequences of
the premise set: Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of Γ iff Γ `LLL Dab(∆)
and there is no Θ ⊂ ∆ such that Γ `LLL Dab(Θ). If Dab(∆) is a minimal
Dab-consequence of Γ, then Γ determines that some member of ∆ behaves ab-
normally, but fails to determine which member of ∆ behaves abnormally. We
have seen that adaptive logics interpret a premise set ‘as normally as possible’.
As some minimal Dab-consequences of Γ may contain more than one disjunct,
this phrase is not unambiguous. It is disambiguated by choosing a specific
adaptive strategy.
The oldest known strategy is Reliability from [3]. The minimal abnormality
strategy was first presented in [2]. It delivers at least the same consequences as
the Reliability strategy, and for some premise sets it delivers more consequences.
Some lower limit logics and sets of abnormalities are such that ∆ is a sin-
gleton whenever Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-consequence of a premise set. If
this is the case, the Reliability strategy and the Minimal Abnormality strategy
lead to the same result and coincide with what is called the Simple strategy: a
formula behaves abnormally just in case the abnormality is derivable from the
premise set—see [19] , [39] and [40] for examples. Several other strategies have
been studied. Most of them are needed to characterize an existing consequence
relation by an adaptive logic. Examples may be found in [7], [11], [22], [32] and
[64].
propositional case. Remark that Replacement of Identicals does not hold in CLuN, viz. does
not hold in the scope of a negation. From a technical point of view, it is easier to handle
CLuN if it is extended with a classical negation ¬ (or with ⊥, characterized by ⊥ ⊃ A). This
greatly simplifies the metatheory. In our preferred application contexts, classical negation
does not occur in the premises.
5Priest’s LP does not contain a detachable implication, and hence the requirement that
all abnormalities are false should be introduced by a rule, viz. A ∧ ∼A/B, in which case the
upper limit logic is CL.
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Every line of an annotated dynamic proof consists of a line number, a for-
mula, a justification, and a condition. The proofs are governed by three (generic)
rules and a marking definition. Let
A ∆
abbreviate that A occurs in the proof on the condition ∆, the rules may then
be phrased as follows:
PREM If A ∈ Γ: . . . . . .
A ∅
RU If A1, . . . , An `LLL B: A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n
RC If A1, . . . , An `LLL B ∨Dab(Θ) A1 ∆1
...
...
An ∆n
B ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n ∪Θ
Given a dynamic proof, we shall say that Dab(∆) is a minimal Dab-formula
at stage s of the proof if, at stage s, Dab(∆) occurs in the proof on the empty
condition and, for any ∆′ ⊂ ∆, Dab(∆′) does not occur in the proof on the
empty condition. Where Dab(∆1), . . . , Dab(∆n) are the minimal Dab-formulas
at stage s of the proof, Us(Γ) = ∆1 ∪ . . . ∪∆n is the set of unreliable formulas
at stage s.
Definition 1 Marking for Reliability: Line i is marked at stage s iff, where Θ
is the condition of line i, Θ ∩ Us(Γ) 6= ∅.
We refer to [8] (and elsewhere) for the marking definition of the Minimal
Abnormality strategy and for that of the Simple strategy.
Remark that the rules depend on the lower limit logic and on the set of
abnormalities, whereas the marking definition depends on the strategy.
A formula is derived from Γ at a stage of the proof iff it is the formula of
a line that is unmarked at that stage. As the proof proceeds, unmarked lines
may be marked and vice versa. So, it is important that one defines a different,
stable, kind of derivability:
Definition 2 A is finally derived from Γ on line i of a proof at stage s iff
(i) A is the formula of line i, (ii) line i is not marked at stage s, and (iii) any
extension of the proof in which line i is marked may be further extended in such
a way that line i is unmarked.
This means that there is a (possibly infinite) proof in which line i is unmarked
and that is stable with respect to line i (line i is unmarked in all extensions of the
proof). The previous definition is more appealing. The only way to establish the
existence of an infinite proof is by a metalinguistic reasoning anyway. Moreover,
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the definition has a nice game-theoretic interpretation: whenever an opponent
is able to extend the proof in such a way that line i is marked, the proponent is
able to extend it further in such a way that line i is unmarked.
Definition 3 Γ `AL A (A is finally AL-derivable from Γ) iff A is finally
derived on a line of a proof from Γ.
The semantics of all adaptive logics is defined in the same way. M |= A will
denote thatM assigns a designated value to A, in other words thatM verifies A.
If the semantics is two-valued—and it is shown in [60] that any semantic system
may be rephrased in two-valued terms—then M |= A comes to vM (A) = 1.
M |= Γ will denote that M verifies all members of Γ.
The abnormal part of a LLL-model M is defined as follows:
Definition 4 Ab(M) = {A ∈ Ω |M |= A}
WhereDab(∆1), Dab(∆2), . . . are the minimalDab-consequences of a premise
set Γ,6 U(Γ) = ∆1 ∪∆2 ∪ . . . is the set of formulas that are unreliable with re-
spect to Γ. Let ALr and ALm be the adaptive logics defined from LLL and Ω
by the Reliability strategy and the Minimal Abnormality strategy respectively.
Definition 5 A LLL-model M of Γ is reliable iff Ab(M) ⊆ U(Γ).
In other words, M is a reliable model of Γ iff it verifies no abnormalities
outside of members of U(Γ), the set of formulas that are unreliable with respect
to Γ.
Definition 6 Γ ²ALr A iff A is verified by all reliable models of Γ.
Definition 7 A LLL-modelM of Γ is minimally abnormal iff there is no LLL-
model M ′ of Γ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M).
Definition 8 Γ ²ALm A iff A is verified by all minimally abnormal models of
Γ.
So the proof theory and the semantics of an adaptive logic are fixed by
the standard format. But there is more. Many metatheoretic properties of
adaptive logics can be proved from the format itself, rather than from the specific
properties of the logic. We mention only some examples. First and foremost,
there are the Soundness and Completeness proof (given that the lower limit
logic is sound and complete with respect to its semantics). The motor for the
dynamic proofs is the Derivability Adjustment Theorem: Γ `ULL A iff there is
a finite ∆ ⊂ Ω such that Γ `LLL A ∨ Dab(∆). An important further property
is Proof Invariance, which states that it does not depend on the way in which
a proof sets out whether a conclusion is finally derivable from a premise set: If
Γ `AL A, then any proof from Γ can be extended into a proof in which A is
finally derived from Γ. A semantically essential property is Strong Reassurance:
IfM is a LLL-model of Γ but not anAL-model of Γ, then there is anAL-model
M ′ such that Ab(M ′) ⊂ Ab(M). For proofs of these and more, see [12] and [16].
6The minimal Dab-consequences of Γ may be semantically defined in view of the soundness
and completeness of LLL with respect to its semantics.
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Nearly all known inconsistency-adaptive logics have a characterization in
standard format.7 In some cases, forging a consequence relation into standard
format may require a translation, for example to a modal language—see Section
5 for an illustration. Even where it is useful to provide ‘direct dynamic proofs’
in untranslated terms—see [25] or [45]—the formulation in standard format
has the advantage to provide the proof theory, semantics and metatheoretic
properties, and to warrant (by an easy demonstration) that the direct proof
theory is correct.
Flip-flops Some adaptive logics are called flip-flops because they have the fol-
lowing weird property: if Γ is normal (has upper limit models), then CnAL(Γ) =
CnULL(Γ), if Γ is abnormal, then CnAL(Γ) = CnLLL(Γ). Flip-flops typically
result from an unsuitable choice of the set of abnormalities Ω. If, for some
adaptive logic, this set is characterized by a restricted logical form, for exam-
ple ∃(A ∧ ∼A) in which A is a primitive formula, and is replaced by the set
characterized by the unrestricted form, in the example all formulas of the form
∃(A ∧ ∼A), a flip-flop results.8
Formula-preferential systems Some adaptive logics were characterized by
formula-preferential systems in [35]—see also [1]. The idea is close to that behind
adaptive logics: the consequence set is determined by the premises, a regular
logic (this actually is the lower limit logic LLL) and a set of preferred formulas.
A subset of the preferred formulas is added to the premises, and the subset
should be maximal with respect to the premises and LLL. It is not clear whether
all adaptive logics can be characterized by a formula-preferential system, but it
is easily provable that all formula-preferential systems are characterized by an
adaptive logic; the characterization requires that the preferences are expressed
in the object language—see Section 3 for means to do so.
The best-studied (and very simple) inconsistency-adaptive logic isACLuN1—
see [3] for its propositional proof theory and [5] for both the syntax and semantics
at the predicative level. Its lower limit logic is CLuN, full positive CL plus
Excluded Middle—see footnote 4. The set of abnormalities, Ω, is the set of
all formulas of the form ∃(A ∧ ∼A), and the strategy is Reliability. The logic
has many nice properties, studied in [5] but also (in a more general framework)
in [8] and [12]. Other well-studied inconsistency-adaptive logics have another
strategy or another lower limit logic.
Some new inconsistency-adaptive logics were developed recently, mainly as a
result of a Ghent–Torun cooperation. A first example is the discussive logicDLr
that constitutes a (non-monotonic) alternative for Jas´kowski’s paraconsistent
system D2 (see [44]). Like D2, DLr validates all single-premise rules of CL.
However, for formulas that behave consistently, DLr moreover validates all
multiple-premise rules of CL—this is realized without the introduction of the
discussive connectives. It is stipulated that A is a DLr-consequence of Γ iff ♦A
is an AJr-consequence of Γ♦ = {♦A | A ∈ Γ}. AJr is in standard format, its
7An exception is Priest’s LPm from [54] and emended in [55]. This adaptive logic proceeds
in terms of properties of the model, rather than in terms of the formulas verified by the model.
8Flip-flops were considered as utterly uninteresting, until some interesting prioritized adap-
tive logics turned out to be flip-flops—see [18].
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elements being S5, Ω = {∃(♦A∧♦∼A) | A ∈ Fp} (Fp are the sentential letters
and primitive predicative formulas), and Reliability.
A second example is the logicAD2, developed by Marek Nasieniewski in [47]
and partly presented in [48]. AD2 is an adaptive extension of D2, including the
discussive connectives. In [48], several important properties of AD2 are studied
and AD2 is compared to DLr.
3 Combining Adaptive Logics
Several ways to combine adaptive logics have been studied. Basically three
methods were obtained, but there is no reason why these should be exhaustive—
we shall not discuss all variants of the combination methods.
If two adaptive logics have the same lower limit logic and the same strat-
egy, the obvious way to combine them is by taking the union of their sets of
abnormalities as the set of abnormalities of the combined logic. The premise
set is then interpreted as normally as possible with respect to both kinds of
abnormalities.
If two or more adaptive logics share their upper limit logic and their strategy,
a combined adaptive logic is obtained by taking as the lower limit logic the
intersection of the lower limit logics and as the set of abnormalities the union
of the sets of abnormalities (and retaining the strategy). The specific example
we want to present deserves a philosophical comment.
Paraconsistent logics allow for negation gluts—they have models that verify
formulas of the form ∃(A ∧ ∼A). However, some inconsistent premise sets also
have a non-trivial consequence set if they are handled by a logic that allows for
conjunction gluts—these have models that verify formulas of the form ∃((A ∧
B) ∧ ∼A) and of the form ∃((A ∧ B) ∧ ∼B). The same is true for logics that
have gluts with respect to some other logical symbol, including the quantifiers
and identity. The same even holds for logics that allow for gaps with respect to
a logical symbol. Consider, for example, the case of negation gaps. If a model
falsifies both p and ∼p, it verifies the premise set {p ⊃ q, p ⊃ ∼q,∼p ⊃ q,∼p ⊃
∼q}. If this premise set is closed by CL, its consequence set is trivial. It follows
that paraconsistency need not be the best road to handling an inconsistent
premise set. In specific cases, a logic allowing for other gluts, or allowing for
gaps, may be more suitable. Let us call such logics paralogics.
Every paralogic gives rise to adaptive logics that interpret the premises as
normally as possible. In other words, the adaptive logics presuppose that formu-
las describing an allowed gap or glut are false unless and until proven otherwise.9
All such logics may be combined by the method discussed two paragraphs
ago. In [6] they are even combined with (a variant of) the ambiguity-adaptive
logic from [61]. The resulting lower limit logic is zero-logic, according to which
no formula (not even a premise) is derivable from a premise set. The adap-
tive logic still interprets the premises as normally as possible. In the special
case where the premise set has CL-models, the adaptive logic delivers all CL-
consequences of the premises.10
9Formulas describing gaps may require that the language is extended by the classical logical
symbol that corresponds to the symbol displaying gluts or gaps. This is an easily solvable
technical problem.
10The basic idea behind the adaptive logic is obviously that all properties of all logical
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A last way to combine adaptive logics is by superimposing adaptive logics on
top of each other. From a definitional point of view, the consequence set of the
combined logic is CnAL2(CnAL1(Γ)). So, Γ is first interpreted as normally as
possible with respect to the abnormalities ofAL1, and the resulting consequence
set is then interpreted as normally as possible with respect to the abnormalities
of AL2. Two problems seem to arise here. First, it appears that the lower
limit logic of AL2 is the adaptive logic AL1, which puts AL2 outside of the
standard format. This is rather easily solved. One can take as the lower limit
logic of AL2 any monotonic logic that does not trivialize CnAL1(Γ)—the lower
limit logic of AL1 is a good candidate, as CnAL1(Γ) is closed under this logic,
but there are other suitable candidates as well.
The second problem is that the above construction seems to require that all
AL1-consequences from the premises are obtained before the result is closed by
AL2, which makes the construction problematic from a computational point of
view. Fortunately, the combined adaptive logic avoids this problem in a way
that seems impressively elegant to us. Let us restrict attention to the special
case where the lower logics of AL1 and AL2 are the same, which makes their
unconditional rules identical. One then simply applies the unconditional rule
and both conditional rules in the usual way. The only difference is that the
marking definition has to be changed into a two-step definition. It comes to
this: first lines are marked with a mark of type 1 according to the marking
definition of AL1, next lines are marked with a mark of type 2 according to
the marking definition of AL2, except that the later definition takes only into
account the lines that are type 1 unmarked. We refer to [8] for details.
A nice example enables one to build combined adaptive logics that handle
preferred consequence sets. Let W be the set of closed formulas of the usual
(non-modal) predicative language, and consider a modal language in which the
diamond is interpreted as “it is plausible that”, more diamonds indicating a
lower plausibility. Moreover, let ♦n abbreviate a sequence of n diamonds. We
now define an infinity of adaptive logics, AMLn having as their lower limit logic
some standard modal logicML, {♦nA∧∼A | A ∈ W} (in which the n is the same
as the one occurring in the name of the logic) as their set of abnormalities, Ω,
and either Reliability or minimal Abnormality as their common strategy.11 The
upper limit logic of each of these adaptive logics is Triv—the system in which
A is logically equivalent to ¤A as well as to ♦A. All these adaptive logics can
be easily combined by the method under discussion in order to handle preferred
statements. The premises will be expressed by a single set of formulas of the
form ♦nA, in which n = 0 for statements that are taken to be certain, n = 1 for
statements of the next highest priority, etc. The deductive closure of a premise
set under the combined adaptive logic will contain the following members ofW:
(i) all CL-consequences of premises that belong to W, (ii) all CL-consequences
of the previous set together with as many as can be consistently added from the
following set: the A ∈ W for which ♦1A is a ML-consequence of Γ, etc.
This construction has been applied (for specific purposes) in [18], [23], [62]
and other papers. As it is described here, it functions only as a way to prevent
inconsistencies from arising. However, it can also be applied to stepwise extend
symbols are defeasible in the sense that one can interpret sensibly a ‘text’ that requires gluts
or gaps with respect to any logical symbol.
11If the purpose is different, the set of abnormalities will be taken to be {¤nA | A ∈ W;
0ML ¤A}—see [19] for an example.
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an inconsistent set with (consequences of) statements that have (a higher or
lower) priority and are compatible with the inconsistent premise set or with its
previous extension—this problem was solved by the results from [43].
4 Rethinking in Terms of Paraconsistency
There is a kind of consistency-laziness in philosophy. Even after being convinced
that many theories are inconsistent, either in themselves or with respect to data
or to other theories, many philosophers will stay content with solving a problem
for the consistent case. Some will argue that it only is the task of philosophers
to offer an explication for or idealization of actual thinking, and then invoke
some fallacious reasoning to conclude that the idealized situation is consistent.
Of course they are free to define whatever they like as the idealized situation.
The point is that they should spell out the relation between their ideal (their
theory) and reality (actual reasoning), and precisely this they usually fail to do.
Others might admit that their theory should handle the inconsistent case to be
correct, but may still argue that they solved an important problem and that it
is now someone else’s task to consider the inconsistent case. Sometimes they
even think the remaining problem to be easily solvable by some paraconsistent
trick. Given this situation, we consider it essential that paraconsistent logicians
put the rethinking of philosophical concepts and theories very high on their
agenda. In this section we consider a few examples where the challenge was met
(in terms of the Ghent approach).
Compatibility is a concept that is invoked in numerous situations. To give
just one example, any extension (not revision) of our knowledge should be com-
patible with our present knowledge. So, if the task is to extend our knowledge
with a new hypothesis or theory, one has to check whether it is compatible with
our present knowledge. There obviously is no positive test for compatibility
(at the predicative level), whence, even in the consistent case, compatibility is
characterized by a adaptive logic, which was described in [19].
As our present knowledge may be inconsistent, this does not fully solve the
problem. Moreover, even defining compatibility in inconsistent environments
raises an interesting problem in that most definitions for consistent compatibility
classify either nothing or everything as compatible with an inconsistent set of
statements. A proposal (possibly the only sensible one) was put forward in [43].
There A is defined as compatible with Γ iff Γ ∪ {A} is not more inconsistent
than Γ—this vague criterion obtains an exact articulation. Relying on it, the
adaptive logic of compatibility for the inconsistent case is spelled out. This logic
is a true generalization of the logic for the consistent case in the sense that both
lead to the same consequence set if Γ is consistent.
In [14] a similar job was done for a very different theory, viz. Hintikka’s
theory of the process of explanation from [34] and elsewhere. Hintikka’s criteria
for an explanation are first adjusted in such a way that they lead to exactly
the same result as the original criteria in the consistent case, but allow for
explanation from inconsistent theories. Next, it is shown that these criteria
can be met by proceeding exactly as Hintikka, except that CL is replaced by
the inconsistency-adaptive ACLuN1. It is shown that the result is a proper
generalization of Hintikka’s theory in that it leads to precisely the same results
in the consistent case, and adjusts this theory in a natural and minimal way in
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the inconsistent case.
The criteria from [14] are applied in [46] to design an adaptive logic for
abduction that enables one to generate explanations for novel facts as well as
for anomalous facts (facts not consistent with one’s background assumptions),
and that moreover can handle possibly inconsistent theories.
An interesting theory on question evocation (by a set of declarative premises)
and question implication (by a set of declarative premises together with a ques-
tion) was proposed by Andrzej Wi´sniewski, for example in [65] and [66]. Al-
though Wi´sniewski intends his theory to be general and relatively independent
of the underlying logic (for the declarative premises), it cannot be applied as it
stands in inconsistent situations. This situation was repaired for question evo-
cation by Kristof De Clercq in a section in [33] and by Joke Meheus in [38]. Both
contributions contain a system that allows for sensible question evocation in the
presence of inconsistent declarative premises and in both cases answers to ques-
tions will repair the undesired incompleteness of the premises—this triggered the
questions. However, the first approach (relying on ACLuN1) is more suitable
if the premises are considered as true, whereas the second is more suitable if one
sets out to obtain a consistent replacement (on the basis of new evidence) for
the premises—it presupposes that the answers obtained have a higher preference
than the original premises. Both approaches generalize Wi´sniewski’s theory in
the sense that they lead to the same results as this theory in the consistent case.
It is well-known that there has hardly been any attention for inconsistent
beliefs in the literature on belief revision. A major contribution to repair this
is contained in [33]. In the second part of this book, Kristof De Clercq presents
a full-fledged replacement for most of the standard theory. Taking inconsistent
belief sets into account, he stepwise adjusts the postulates, the (tiresome) def-
initions, and the construction. He goes on to present and prove an impressive
set of metatheorems, often developing new proof techniques, to show that the
whole framework is adequate. He also shows that his framework leads to the
same changes as the standard one if it is applied to consistent belief sets.
5 Further Work on Integration
Some of the Rescher–Manor mechanisms from [57]—for an overview see [26] for
the flat ones and [27] for the prioritized ones—were among the first inconsistency-
handling mechanisms. The flat ones were characterized by an adaptive logic in
[7] (in terms of inconsistency-adaptive logics close to ACLuN1). Insights pro-
vided by [44] led to new results in [11]: the flat mechanisms are characterized in
terms of modal adaptive logics, and sensible extensions of them are presented
(mainly with discussive application contexts in mind—see also [63]). The pri-
oritized mechanisms were characterized by adaptive logics in [64].
Another approach to paraconsistent reasoning that has been gaining pop-
ularity are the signed systems from [28] and other papers. These systems are
characterized by adaptive logics in [22].
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6 Criteria for Final Derivability
The proofs of adaptive logics are dynamic: a line that was introduced may later
be marked, still later unmarked, etc. This is not a disadvantage of adaptive
logics, but a result of the properties of the consequence relations that adaptive
logics explicate. As there is no positive test for these consequence relations (at
the predicative level), a non-dynamic proof theory cannot possibly be provided.
Even in the absence of a positive test, there may be criteria that enable one
to decide that a finite proof warrants that one of its lines will not be marked
in any extension of the proof—in other words that the extensions of the proof
are stable with respect to this line. The search for criteria led, first to [4],
which provided interesting but weak criteria, and next to [20] and [21], which
provided criteria in terms of tableau methods. The disadvantage of the latter is
that they are rather remote from proofs and moreover require many steps that
seem intuitively useless.
Work on a completely different problem provided a way out. In [24], a spe-
cial proof format was devised (for propositional CL) in which part of the proof
heuristics is pushed into the proof—in [56] the result is extended to full (pred-
icative) CL. In [10] and [13]—the latter paper is in the most recent format and
contains the metatheory—the approach is applied to propositional CLuN and
next is turned into a procedural criterion for final derivability in ACLuN1.12
It can easily be seen that the approach can be generalized to the predicative
case (where it really pays), and next can be generalized to any adaptive logic—
although further work is clearly required to incorporate other strategies. The
advantage of the procedural criterion is that it sets off from a clear goal (the
formula one tries to derive), that every step in the prospective proof is demon-
strably sensible (in view of the stage of the proof) for reaching this goal, and
that, if the procedure stops, which obviously cannot be warranted at the pred-
icative level, one knows whether the goal is or is not derivable from the premises.
If desired, the prospective proof can be algorithmically turned into a standard
adaptive logic proof.
7 Moving towards Consistency
We saved a philosophical problem for the last section. Suppose that a theory was
intended as consistent but turns out to be inconsistent, which is the preferred
application context of inconsistency-adaptive logics. The adaptive logic locates
the inconsistencies and isolates them (prevents them from spreading). As we
have seen, the CL-consequences that cannot be drawn from the theory (or
premise set) will be those that are prevented by the minimal disjunctions of
abnormalities that are derivable from the premises by the lower limit logic.
Suppose that the following formula is a minimal disjunction:
(p ∧ ∼p) ∨ (q ∧ ∼q) ∨ (r ∧ ∼r) .
So the theory states that either p or q or r behaves inconsistently, but fails to
specify which of the three does.
12A computer program that implements the procedure can be downloaded from
http://logica.ugent.be/centrum/writings/programs.php.
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One clearly will like to go beyond isolating the inconsistencies: one will want
to obtain a consistent replacement for the inconsistent theory, provided the
latter is an improvement of the former. Given this qualification the task is not
one for logic—it may require gathering new evidence, forging a new conceptual
system, etc. However, the task will require guidance by logic.
In agreement with Wi´sniewski’s erotetic logic, the minimal Dab-consequence
of the premises will evoke the question ?{p∧∼p, q ∧∼q, r ∧∼r}. Depending on
the epistemic situation, it may be possible to obtain a (full or partial) answer to
this question. Nearly every answer will free one of the three formulas from the
suspicion of inconsistency. As an effect, more CL-consequences of the premise
set will be finally derivable and the remaining problems are better located. The
explication of such processes proceeds in terms of the method from [38].
In some cases, no answer to the aforementioned question can be obtained.
Even then, a researcher may discover reasons to narrow down the suspicion.
For example, q may be well entrenched in other theories that are considered
unproblematic, whence the researcher may decide to consider q as behaving
consistently. Or the researcher might have reasons to suspect p, and decide
that the inconsistency lies there. Clearly such decisions should themselves be
defeasible. New information may put the blame elsewhere.
These problems are considered in [15] and the required adaptive logics are
spelled out and shown to be adequate. Actually two approaches turn out sensible
for expressing suspicion or freedom of suspicion in a defeasible way, one relying
on the modal approach mentioned at the end of Section 3, the other in terms
of a hierarchy of negations of inconsistencies.
There are many open problems, even for logic, concerning the road from
inconsistent theories to consistent replacements for them (in cases where there
are such replacements). Still, the previous results clarify a further bit of that
road. We’ll get there, step by step.13
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